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Abstract
The paper investigates whether there is a significance difference between the practices of discretionary loan/finance loss provisions between
Islamic and conventional banks. Same time, the paper tests whether the efficiency may influence the behaviour of discretionary loans/finance
loss provisions, taken into consideration other micro and macro variables. The study utilizes panel data runs over 1996–2011 with unbalanced
observations for 16 banks, of which 4 Islamic banks. In order to achieve research objectives, the two-stage approach is adopted to examine the
factors that may influence the behaviour of discretionary loan/finance loss provisions with specific emphasize on the efficiency. Furthermore,
efficiency scores are estimated using Data Envelopment Windows Analysis. The findings of the research show that Islamic banks employ the
discretionary loans/finance loss provisions to manage their earnings. However, the magnitude of discretion of accruals is significantly lower
than conventional banks with exception for foreign banks which have reported lower discretionary loans/finance loss provisions than Islamic
banks. Moreover, the analysis showed that efficiency affects the overall discretionary loans/finance loss provision positively, although this
impact is shaped differently for Islamic and conventional banks.
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1. Introduction
The issue of earnings management has received attention
from practitioners and academicians for few decades in banking
sector. It is evident that bank managers practice the discretion in
estimating loan/finance loss provisions for various motives such
as reducing earnings variability (Agarwal, Chomsisengphet,
Liu, & Rhee, 2007; Kanagaretnam, 2004; Kim & Kross, 1998;
Niswander & Swanson, 2000; Shrieves & Dahl, 2003).
However, large body of literature have been conducted in the
conventional banks and only few studies have focused on
Islamic banks, for instance, Zoubi and Al-Khazali (2007) and
Othman and Mersni (2014).
The significance of examining the issue in the context of
Islamic banks stems from the fact that Islamic banks should not
manage their earnings as conventional banks. This is because
the underlying theoretical basis of Islamic banks is different
from conventional banks. Islamic banks are based on Shari’ah
principles, which constitute the linchpin of practices of Islamic
banks. For example, Imam and Kpodar (2013) concluded that
in the determination of Islamic bank expansion around the
world, the interest rates were found to have a negative impact on
banking selection, and the quality of institutions was not found
to be a significant determinant. In such a way, Islamic banks
must abide by the moral values of Shari’ah in all aspects includ-
ing the business practices (Hamdi & Zarai, 2012). Therefore,
it is important to underscore that the practices of earnings
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management in Islamic banking should not follow the same
pattern as that of conventional banks. It would be of grave
concern in Islamic banks given their ethical content and iden-
tity. In this regard, the Islamic banks should be more aware and
reluctant than other organizations including conventional banks
to earnings management activities, regardless of the fact that
earnings management or manipulation is carried out through
sound accounting practices and within the generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP). Islamic banks need to abide by
their laws in all aspects and hence earnings management prac-
tices are deemed unethical as they tend to present a distorted
picture.
Looking at the issue in depth and given the principles and the
structure of Islamic banks, one of the unique characteristics of
Islamic finance and Islamic banks is the observation of ethical
values and Shari’ah constrains in their day-to-day operation
(Saiti, Bacha, & Masih, 2014). Ethical and moral consider-
ations should be followed in their substance (Hamdi & Zarai,
2012). As the earning management definition proposed by
Healy and Wahlen (1999) represents an attempt at modifying
financial numbers so as to either (i) mislead some stakeholders
or (ii) influence contractual outcomes, it is very clear that
both incentives are loaded with the concept of opportunistic
behaviour, which is prohibited in Islam. This behaviour is con-
demned in Islam and there is an established code of ethics to be
followed in all matters of conducting trade and business.
According to Hamdi and Zarai (2013) Islamic banks should
abide by and adopt the ethical codes in their strategic choices of
products and services, how to deliver these products and ser-
vices, how to finance their businesses, how to manage their
day-to-day business practices and in what way they should be
accountable to their stakeholders. Keeping high ethical values
of business should be a priority for Islamic banks. Islamic
banks executives are supposed to demonstrate high values
which will not allow them to hide business practices that are not
sync with Shari’ah. Therefore, with best business practices and
high standards of morality, Islamic banks will refrain from
manipulating their results through opportunistic earnings man-
agement or discretionary loan/finance loss provisions. Hamdi
and Zarai (2013) have argued that Islamic banks should behave
ethically and be free from manipulations out of sync with
Islamic ethical values that prohibit harm to others from any
kind of injustice, which includes disclosures of unfair and unre-
liable information in the annual reports.
Adopting the Discretionary Loan/Finance Loss Provisions
(DLLP) as a measure of earning management, this paper, there-
fore, aims to examine the earnings management practices of
Islamic banks in Yemen in a comparative fashion with conven-
tional banks; and to investigate whether the efficiency may
shape the managers opportunistic behaviour to use DLLP to
alter the earnings inYemeni banking sector. Arguably, earnings
management is more important for less efficient firms. Bank
managers are always subject to huge reputational and regula-
tory pressures to ensure stable earnings. In most cases, bonuses
and incomes are linked to performance targets. As such, man-
agers have incentives to ensure stable earnings. Earnings lower
than previous years would reflect poorly on the management,
which motivates them to manage bank earnings (Farook, Hasan
and Clinch, 2014).
Our study contributes to the literature in the field of earnings
management in Islamic banking. Specifically, this study use
DLLP as proxy for earnings management rather than focussing
on the overall LLP. Furthermore, this study compares the DLLP
of Islamic and conventional banks for the specific case of
Yemen, which remained unexplored. Besides, the study links
the DLLP with efficiency rather than using traditional perfor-
mance measures. To our best of knowledge, this study repre-
sents the first pioneer effort at examining the impact of
efficiency on earnings quality in the context of Yemen using an
objective measure of performance, compared to subjective and
average traditional performance measures. Despite the exten-
sive literature examining the earnings management and perfor-
mance, the literature investigating the efficiency measures and
earnings management remains scarce and this study aims to fill
the void gap. The uniqueness of this method over traditional
performance measures, such as Return on Assets (ROA) or
Return on Equity (ROE) lies in its objectivity. Efficiency fron-
tier methods are more objective than the financial ratios com-
monly used in financial analysis because these ratios only
assess the average performance, whereas the efficient frontier
method measures the distance of each observation relative to a
target (Guillén, Rengifo, & Ozsoz, 2014). Therefore, we argue
that drawing a conclusion on the link between performance and
earnings quality based on this method is superior to that based
on traditional methods. Moreover, using DLLPs as a proxy for
earning quality rather than LLP as an aggregate measure
provide better assessment for the discretionary part of accruals
that depends on the managers and not the business activities. As
this portion subjects to discretions and could be altered based
on the results of operations.
Using a data of 16 banks in Yemen over the period 1996–
2011, the results indicate that Islamic banks are not abiding by
Shari’ah law in their operations as they tend to use discretion
to manipulate their earnings in similar way with conventional
banks. However, the magnitude of earnings management in
Islamic banks is significantly lower than conventional banks
with exception of foreign conventional banks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follow: Effi-
ciency and DLLP theoretical relationship is discussed in
Section 2. Section 3 presents literature review and hypotheses
development. Data and methodology are discussed in Section 4.
The findings of research are reported in Section 5. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2. Efficiency and DLLP: theoretical relationship
As a measure of performance, efficiency may have an impact
on loan/finance loss provision and in particular DLLP. The
authors believe that efficiency is a better measure for the per-
formance of banks compared to averaging method such as ROA
and ROE. Previous studies have found a link between the earn-
ings quality and traditional performance measures such as
Return on Assets (ROA). However, some banks perform better
than others. This is an indisputable fact, but how do we actually
recognize a high performing bank? Can one consider a very
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profitable bank a high performer or more efficient and vice
versa? In this context, the efficiency frontier measures the
deviation of a company’s performance relative to that of the
most successful bank. The main advantage of the efficiency
frontier with respect to other performance indicators is that it is
an objective quantitative measure.
With respect to relationship between DLLPs and efficiency,
it can be argued that there is a theoretical relationship between
efficiency and DLLP arising from the fact that subpar managers
do not sufficiently monitor and control their operation which
is reflected in low measured cost efficiency as a signal of
poor managerial performance, in turn, affects loan granting
behaviour (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). Indeed, poor managers
do not adequately monitor loan portfolio management, owing to
either poor loan evaluation skills or inadequate allocation of
resources for loan monitoring activities. This results in a greater
volume of non-performing loans. All these lend support to
the hypothesis that lower efficiency would contribute to non-
performing loans, requiring higher level of loan loss provision,
which consequently, would lead to lower earnings. Thus, the
manager would be motivated to boost their earnings by exer-
cising their discretion over LLP in order to reduce the impact on
earnings and try, among others, to influence contractual out-
comes of bonus plans, debt covenants, and political costs.
Bank managers with poor skills in credit scoring tend to go
for choose a relatively high proportion of loans/finance with
low or negative net present values (Berger and DeYoung, 1997).
They may also be less than fully competent in appraising the
value of collateral pledged against the loans, and have difficulty
in monitoring and controlling the borrowers after loans are
issued to ensure that covenants are obeyed. Poor underwriting
and monitoring practices would lead to more non-performing
loans with moaning delinquencies. Thus, under the bad man-
agement hypothesis, low cost-efficiency is expected to occur
due to above-mentioned reasons, all of which would badly
affect the performance in term of earnings, creating incentives
for managers to resort to earnings management practices to
overcome and hide reduced earnings. This logic makes consid-
erable sense in the context of Yemen where non-performing
loans are on the rise, especially for conventional banks. This
requires high loan loss provision to face such high expected loss
and, in turn, the managers of banks with high non-performing
loans ratio would tend to exercise their discretion over loan loss
provision in order to hide the impact of high loan loss provision
on earnings and to reduce the perceived credit risk. Further-
more, the bad management hypothesis may apply to Yemen in
other context, where the loans granting behaviour, to some
extent, depends more on relationship rather than creditworthi-
ness. This also may occur as banks are mostly family businesses
and hence they prefer to grant loans or financing to their related
businesses.
3. Literature review and hypotheses development
Several studies have investigated the earnings management
in the banking sector and managers’ use of discretion in esti-
mating loan loss provisions to reduce earnings variability
(Agarwal et al., 2007; Kanagaretnam, 2004; Kim & Kross,
1998; Niswander & Swanson, 2000; Shrieves & Dahl, 2003).
They find that banks with relatively high pre-managed earnings
have positive DLLPs and banks with relatively low pre-
managed earnings have negative DLLPs, consistently with the
hypothesis that earnings management helps to reduce earnings
variability. In addition, they find that bank managers’ decisions
to reduce earnings variability are related to the need for external
financing and gains and losses on the sale of securities which
serve as substitutes for accomplishing their objective of earn-
ings variability reduction.
Ahmed, Takeda, & Thomas (1999) provide strong support
for the hypothesis that loan loss provisions are used for earnings
management and discovered that a positive relationship exists
between earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions (EBTP)
and loan loss provisions. However, contrary to their expecta-
tions, they reveal that there is no significance relationship
between earnings and loan loss provisions. Beatty, Ke, and
Petroni (2002) also evidently show that managers have incen-
tives to smoothe earnings. In particular, when earnings are
expected to be low, loan loss provisions are deliberately under-
stated to mitigate the adverse effects of other factors on earn-
ings. Likewise, Niswander and Swanson (2000), using call
report data, examined whether the discretionary portion of loan
loss provisions is influenced by the banks’ level of capital,
earnings, and taxes. In a sample of 11,000 banks, they indicate
that banks below the capital adequacy threshold often make
discretionary choices that reduce earnings and capital. Banks
above the threshold exhibit different discretionary outcomes,
with evidence of income-smoothing and tax-advantaged
actions.
While the above studies deal with the issue of capital and
earnings management in conventional banks, studies that look
into the LLP in Islamic banks are scarce with only a few studies
examining the issues in some Muslims countries. Zoubi and
Al-Khazali (2007) investigated the factors that affect loss
provisions for financing and investment in Mudharabah and
Musharakah for banks in Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC).
The findings of the study reveals that managers of banks in the
GCC region smoother earnings via loss provisions. The results
also show that when return on assets before tax and loss provi-
sions for a current year is higher than the previous year’s return
on assets, then management is expected to increase loss provi-
sions for the current year. The results support the income
smoothing hypothesis. A highly indicative and significant result
is that the type of bank (Islamic or conventional) is not an
important factor in the determination of the loan loss provi-
sions. This means that Islamic banks follow the practices of
conventional banks either in creating the financing loss provi-
sions or in managing capital and earnings via financing loss
provisions.
Similarly, Misman and Ahmed (2011) find a significance
difference between the LLP of Islamic and conventional banks,
however, both Islamic and conventional banks in Malaysia
resort to earning management via LLP. Taktak, Zouari, &
Boudriga (2010) find a contrast evidence showing that Islamic
banks do not use LLP extensively. Ben Othman and
Mersni (2014) examine the practices of DLLP by Islamic and
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conventional banks in the Middle East and the findings show
that Islamic banks use DLLP for smoothing and capital man-
agement in similar vein with conventional banks.
Despite the extensive literature examining the earnings man-
agement and performance, the literature investigating the effi-
ciency measures and earnings management remains scarce.
However, Naffati, Ben Fredj, and Schalck (2011) provide evi-
dence that efficiency and earnings management were closely
related. Higher banking performance corresponds to lower
earnings management. Firms whose performance is close to the
border have low earnings management because the deviation
from the best performing firm is low. In contrast, a large gap
encourages managers to carry out aggressive earnings manage-
ment to improve performance and achieve the value realized by
the most efficient firm.
3.1. Overall DLLP: Islamic vs. conventional banks
Watts & Zimmerman (1986) formulate PAT around manage-
ment compensation, debt covenant and political violations.
They hypothesize that managers try to influence contractual
outcomes of bonus plan and the debt covenant, and reduce
political costs by exercising judgement over accounting accru-
als. This applies to all firms including banks, and the literature
provides evidence that conventional and Islamic banks resort to
manipulation of earnings like other firms in various sectors.
However, in the view of the authors, the level of discretionary
accruals in conventional and Islamic banks may differ, as the
ethical principles laid down by Shari’ah would understandably
restrain Islamic banks from engaging in discretionary accruals
as a way of altering earnings. Islamic banks are expected to
behave more ethically as opportunistic behaviour is disallowed
in Islam. Islamic banks should be ethical in all matters, includ-
ing reporting aspects. Disclosures of unfair and unreliable
information in the annual reports resemble opportunistic
behaviours. Therefore, it is hypothesized that discretionary
accruals are more prevalent among the conventional banks than
in Islamic banks.
H1. Compared to conventional counterparts, Islamic banks are
more likely to refrain from using DLLPs in managing their
earnings.
With regards to influential factors on DLLP, the main factor
proposed in this study is the efficiency. Based on various media
reports, theYemeni banking sector is performing poorly, which
creates incentives for managers to use DLLP more aggressively
to report good performance Neffati, Ben Fredj, & Schalck
(2011) argued that the DLLP is more crucial for the inefficient
than the efficient firms. This is because the inefficient banks are
expected to report positive result and stabilize their earnings to
avoid any public repercussion. This creates an incentive for
managers to manage their earnings with higher DLLP (lower
LLP) in order to maintain their reputation and reduce the
regulatory pressures. Whenever the efficiency is not at the
optimal level, the performance and earnings would be affected
adversely. Earnings lower than previous years would reflect
poorly on the management, which motivates them to manage
bank earnings (Farook, Hasan and Clinch, 2014). However, this
would apply to conventional banks and that the efficiency is less
likely to lead Islamic banks to use their discretion over LLP in
order to manage their earnings, given their Shari’ah constrains.
Thus, the following hypothesis is formulated:
H2. In contrast to conventional banks, DLLPs of Islamic banks
is not related to efficiency.
Apart from efficiency, this study utilizes additional variables
to control for micro and macro economic factors. This includes
capitalization, size, loan to deposits, type of auditor and GDP.
The literature on conventional banks provides some evidences
that conventional banks use DLLP to manage their capital. As
an influential factor, capital is expected to be related negatively
to DLLP. In the banking sector, equity capital is heavily regu-
lated. Therefore, when banks experience low levels of capital
relative to the regulatory standards required to be considered
well-capitalized, managers have incentives to avoid writing
off bad loans and to realize more securities gains in order to
prop up capital levels (Cornett, McNutt, & Tehranian, 2009).
Further, the executives can smoothen earnings downward inter-
temporally only when banks are considered well-capitalized.
As such, the well-capitalised banks tend to report higher DLLP
than the less capitalised banks. However, Islamic banks are
expected to refrain from resorting to DLLP to manage their
capital due to ethical dimensions laid down by Shari’ah. Thus,
the following hypothesis is proposed.
H3. In contrast to conventional banks, Islamic banks are not
likely to use DLLP for capital management.
With respect to size, larger banks are more likely to engage
in discretionary accruals as they face more pressure than small
banks, and they are more likely to use earnings management to
reduce political scrutiny, as argued by Watts & Zimmerman
(1986). In addition, when the banks are bigger in size, their
capacity to bargain with auditors becomes stronger compared to
the smaller banks (Kim, Liu and Rhee, 2003). Unlike conven-
tional banks, Islamic banks may not pay attention to their values
regardless of the political sensitivity of larger banks. Moreover,
their bargain power with auditors is much more constrained by
their values compared to conventional banks.
H4. Unlike conventional banks, the size of Islamic banks are
less likely to be related to DLLPs.
Loan to deposit ratio (LD) is used in the literature as a proxy
for external financing. If the ratio is high, the bank is in need
of external financing and therefore, there is a tendency for the
banks to report low DLLP so as to portray the low perceived
credit risks and higher reported income in order to attract more
deposit from the creditors and to give confidence to the deposi-
tors to channel their funds to the banks. DLLPs of conventional
banks relate to LD negatively (Kanagaretnam, 2004; Kwak,
Lee, & Eldridge, 2009). However, Islamic banks are anticipated
to not alter their LLP as a response to the financing to deposits
ratio (FD).
H5. Unlike conventional banks, DLLPs of Islamic banks is
anticipated to be not related to FD ratio.
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The role auditor in curbing earnings management also is
very crucial. Prior studies provide evidence that reputable audi-
tors have huge resources to perform auditing with due care.
Arguably, the quality and reliability of financial reporting has
much to do with the reputable international companies, as no
single client is too important to larger accounting firms which
are less likely to compromise their independence (DeAngelo,
1986). However, we propose that DLLP is less prevailed in
banks whose auditors are among the international auditing
companies. More importantly, the Islamic banks power to
bargain with auditors is very restricted by Shari’ah law. Thus,
the following relationship is anticipated:
H6. Unlike conventional banks, DLLPs of Islamic banks are
anticipated to not be related with auditor type.
Fonseca & González (2008) advocated that the growth of
real per capita GDP be included to control for the documented
pro-cyclical effect of provisioning. The common view is that an
economic upswing with rising incomes indicates improving
conditions for firms with reduced likelihood of loan defaults,
whereas a downturn or a recession will have the opposite effect.
Banks are expected to reflect this feature in their decisions by
lowering provisions during an economic boom and increasing
them during a downturn. According to this cyclical behaviour, a
negative coefficient for GDP in the loan loss provision equation
is expected. Based on the above discussion, the following
hypothesis is crafted:
H7. Overall DLLP of the whole banking sector in Yemen is
expected to be negatively related to GDP.
4. Data and methodology
4.1. Data
The sample examined here consists of all banks operating
in Yemen during the period of analysis (1996–2011). In total,
there are 16 commercial banks operating in Yemen, of which
four are Islamic banks. As the sample period envelops all com-
mercial banks for the 1996–2011 periods with unbalanced
observations, one would expect to have 230 observations for the
entire period. However, after excluding the missing data, 221
observations were available for analysis. The data used in this
study is obtained from the annual reports of the banks and the
World Bank for the GDP.
4.2. Measurement of DLLP
Following previous literature, two-stage method for testing
the discretionary accruals practices through DLLP is adopted
(Kanagaretnam, 2004; Taktak et al., 2010). In the first step of
first stage, the non-discretionary LLP (NDLLP) is estimated
using the model in equation (1) so that the DLLP is isolated
from the total LLP. Consistent with previous research, the
change in non-performing loans (CHNPLit), the beginning
balance of non-performing loans (NPLit−1), and change in total
loans (CHLOANit) are used to estimate the non-discretionary
component of LLP.
LLP NPL CHNPL CHLOANit it it it it= + + + +−α β β β ε0 1 1 2 3 (1)
The NDLLPs represents the portion of total LLP dictated by
changes in the business condition which cannot be controlled
by managers. It is expected that the above variables are associ-
ated positively with LLPs. This is because higher non-
performing loans will warrant higher loan loss provisions. Any
positive changes in total loans may indicate the increase of
uncollectable loans which ultimately leads to apportion of
higher loan loss provisions to meet the expected losses. While
the above equation estimates the non-discretionary portion of
LLP, the DLLP is estimated as the residual in Equation (2).
Using the estimated coefficients (β1, β2, β3), the NDLLP is
calculated as follows:
NDLLP NPL CHNPL CHLOANit it it it it= + + + +−α β β β ε0 1 1 2 3
(2)
At the final step, the DLLP is calculated as the difference
between total LLP and estimated NDLLP by the Equation (3).
DLLP LLP NPL CHNPL CHLOANit it it it= − + +[ ]−β β β1 1 2 3 (3)
4.3. Analytical tests
4.3.1Parametric and non-parametric tests
To compare DLLPs across banks, the test of difference is
applied. Both parametric and non-parametric tests were under-
taken to compare whether the DLLPs differ between Islamic
and conventional banks.
4.3.2Regression estimation
This research adopts two-stage approach, where in the first
stage, the DLLP is estimated and is used as dependent variable
in the second stage to be regressed against influential variables
in Equation (4). Table 1 shows that summary of the variables.
Panel data estimation with unbalanced data over 1996–2011
is used to examine the impact of efficiency and other determi-
nants on DLLP in the Yemen banking sector in a comparative
manner between Islamic and conventional banks.Validity test is
used to select the appropriate statistical tests for the regression
model among various panel techniques. Specifically, Breusch–
Pagan Lagranges Multiplier (LM) is applied to choose between
pooled OLS and random effects. Moreover, since the regression
model contains dummy variable, which is fixed, it will be
perfectly correlated with bank-specific effects. Accordingly,
fixed effects cannot be employed, and the random effects are
used against the pooled OLS. Therefore, if the null hypothesis
Table 1
Summary of the variables.
Variable Name of the variable Operationalisation
DLLPs Discretionary Accruals proxy
for earning quality
Estimated
TE (X-EFF) Overall Efficiency Ln (DEA Estimate)
CAP Capital Ratio Ln (Capital/Assets)
TA Size of the Bank Ln (Total assets)
LD Loan to Deposits Ln (Total loan/Total
deposits)
GDP Gross Domestic Product GDP (IMF)
Auditor Dummy Auditor 1 for big, 0 otherwise
Dummy Islamic Dummy Islamic Banks 1 for Islamic, 0 otherwise
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is rejected then it can be concluded that there is a significant
random effects in the panel data and that the random effect
model fits to deal with heterogeneity better than the pooled OLS
(Dougherty, 2007). The following model is estimated:
DLLPs TE CAP LD Size GDP= + + + + +
+ +
α β β β β β
β β
1 2 3 4 5
6 7DummyIslamic DummyAuditor ε
(4)
5. Empirical findings
5.1. Summary statistics
Using the panel data technique over the 1996–2011 periods,
the coefficient parameters of first stage regression are calcu-
lated. Arising from Equation (1), Table 2 presents the mean
coefficient estimate for ß1, ß2, ß3. The model has a moderate
explanatory power with an adjusted R2 of 43.5%. As expected,
the sign of non-performing (NPL) is positive and significant.
The sign of change in non-performing loans (CNPL) is positive,
but insignificant. This indicates that higher NPL and CNPL
increase the level of LLP. However, the sign for loans is nega-
tive and insignificant which is not in line with the expectation.
Overall, the model fit is significant at 1% level with an F value
of 26.61.
Using the coefficient parameters for Beg. NPL, change in
NPL and total loans, the process of evaluation of NDLLPs is
conducted. In the last step, the difference between total LLPs
and NDLLPs constitutes the portion of DLLP out of the total
LLPs. Based on the results of the first stage analysis, the trends
of DLLPs during the 1996–2011 period is reported in Table 3.
Table 3 shows that overall DLLPs for the entire period stood at
1.2% out of total assets (5.6% out of total loans) which indi-
cates that discretionary accruals activities loom very high in the
Yemeni banking sector. Evidently, the percentage of DLLPs
relative to its total assets or loans was on a rise from 1997 till
2001. A likely reason for that is the implementation of financial
reforms with strict regulations, which motivated the banks to
manipulate their earnings to avoid scrutiny. In addition, this
period experienced declining efficiency, as shown in Fig. 1, and
this could have motivated banks to engage in more earnings
manipulation in order to show favourable results. Subsequently,
DLLPs showed a downward trend over time, as can be seen in
Table 3.
Further analysis is conducted in order to show the trend of
DLLPs across different types of ownership. Table 4 and Fig. 2
show that overall DLLPs have been higher for conventional
banks than for Islamic banks. This lends no supports for our
argument that indicates the conservatism of Islamic banks to
engage in discretionary accruals, given their ethical identity.
The results in Table 4 further indicate that foreign banks are
less involved in managing their LLPs compared to all local
banks including Islamic banks. However, Islamic banks have
lower levels of DLLPs among the local banks. Interestingly,
state-owned banks ranked second in DLLPs activities after pri-
vately owned banks. This may indicate that state-owned banks
face less pressures, as their managers are politically appointed
and their jobs depends on the political agenda rather than the
performance of the banks. Table 4 and Fig. 2 also show that
local conventional banks and Islamic banks have experienced
higher levels of DLLPs than foreign banks.
5.2. Comparison between DLLPs of Islamic and
conventional Banks
This section presents the results of parametric and non-
parametric tests of difference, i.e. whether there is statistically
significant difference in DLLPs across banks. Overall, the
various tests reported that there is a significant difference
between DLLPs for Islamic and conventional banks as docu-
mented in Table 5 panel A. Although in Panel A, the non-
parametric tests show insignificant difference between DLLPs
of Islamic banks compared to that of conventional banks, para-
metric tests indicate that there is a difference at 5% level of
significance. Other tests for the comparison between Islamic
banks and different types of conventional banks confirm that
Islamic banks engage less in DLLPs than conventional banks.
However, as reported in Table 5 Panel E, foreign banks show
significantly (at 1% level of significance) lower levels of DLLPs
compared to that of Islamic banks, presumably a reflection of
best practices of their parent banks.
Farook, Hassan and Clinch (2014) showed similar evidence
in which Islamic banks have lower loan loss provision com-
pared to conventional banks. It is of importance for Islamic
banks to behave more ethically compared to conventional banks
and abide by Shari’ah, which is loaded with moral values that
Table 2
Results of regression in stage one.
Variables Coefficient estimate (p-value)
Beg. NPL 0.166 (0.000)
ΔNPL 0.027 (0.525)
ΔTL −0.003 (0.866)
F-statistic 26.61
R2 overall 0.435
Table 3
Summary of DLLPs for 1997–2011.
Year DLLPs % of total assets DLLPs % of total loan
Mean Max Min Std.
Dev.
Mean Max Min Std.
Dev.
1997 0.012 0.013 0.066 −0.001 0.028 0.111 −0.004 0.034
1998 0.014 0.014 0.065 −0.005 0.036 0.124 −0.001 0.035
1999 0.022 0.022 0.086 −0.003 0.066 0.195 0.003 0.061
2000 0.021 0.021 0.114 −0.002 0.114 0.613 −0.006 0.168
2001 0.029 0.029 0.132 −0.001 0.154 0.561 0.004 0.185
2002 0.018 0.018 0.110 −0.001 0.110 0.567 −0.018 0.169
2003 0.006 0.006 0.026 −0.004 0.038 0.112 −0.010 0.043
2004 0.009 0.009 0.035 −0.010 0.043 0.110 0.003 0.034
2005 0.009 0.009 0.046 −0.007 0.030 0.092 0.001 0.029
2006 0.005 0.005 0.019 −0.004 0.028 0.111 −0.004 0.033
2007 0.004 0.004 0.023 −0.002 0.029 0.098 −0.007 0.036
2008 0.006 0.006 0.019 −0.006 0.024 0.083 −0.013 0.025
2009 0.005 0.005 0.023 −0.006 0.024 0.088 −0.012 0.029
2010 0.007 0.007 0.024 −0.005 0.033 0.096 −0.013 0.035
2011 0.016 0.016 0.115 −0.001 0.086 0.472 −0.013 0.144
Average
DLLPs
0.012 0.056
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prevent them from presenting a distorted picture of accounting
figures. Islamic banks executives are supposed to demonstrate
high values, which will not allow them to hide business prac-
tices that are not sync with Shari’ah. Therefore, with best
business practices and high standards of morality, Islamic
banks would refrain from manipulating their results through
opportunistic earnings management. A possible explanation for
Islamic banks indulgence DLLP for Islamic banks could be
because the Islamic banks manage earnings as a response to
profit distributions. In particular, when the overall revenue
share allocated for investment depositors fail to meet their
expectations, it is likely that shareholders’ share of profits will
be sacrificed for higher profit distributions to investment
depositors. This in turn will lead to pressure on the Islamic bank
Fig. 1. DLLPs and efficiency trend.
Table 4
DLLPs by ownership.
Year Bank model
All conventional Islamic banks State-owned banks Foreign-owned banks Domestic private Local conventional
1997 0.013 0.01 0.022 0 0.01 0.015
1998 0.016 0.006 0.026 0.001 0.012 0.018
1999 0.026 0.012 0.018 0.001 0.037 0.029
2000 0.025 0.006 0.002 0.007 0.052 0.031
2001 0.035 0.009 0.024 0.006 0.062 0.046
2002 0.022 0.006 0.011 0.002 0.049 0.032
2003 0.008 0.001 0.008 0 0.018 0.013
2004 0.01 0.007 0.014 −0.001 0.019 0.017
2005 0.008 0.01 0.004 −0.001 0.021 0.014
2006 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.009 0.008
2007 0.005 0.002 0.008 0.001 0.006 0.006
2008 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.002 0.006 0.006
2009 0.004 0.008 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.006
2010 0.008 0.004 0.01 0.001 0.015 0.013
2011 0.019 0.01 0.013 0.005 0.03 0.023
Mean 0.014 0.007 0.012 0.002 0.023 0.018
Fig. 2. DLLPs based on ownership.
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manager to avail its discretionary capabilities over finance loss
provisions (by reducing the expense) and provide an acceptable
return for shareholders.
All in all, as long as the accounting practices are similar
for Islamic and conventional banks, it seems that Islamic banks
follow that same patterns and behaviours of conventional banks
ignoring that fact that their underlying theoretical bases are
completely different and hence their practices should be in line
with their purpose of existence. The main purpose of Islamic
finance and Islamic banking is to serve the needs of Muslims,
who are abided by Shari’ah guidelines; therefore, any sort of
activities that are not in line with Shari’ah laws is totally
prohibited.
5.3. Panel regression results
The second part of the analysis is to regress the various
determinants of DLLPs using pooled OLS as the baseline
regression and compare it with random effects. Initially, Table 6
documents the descriptive statistics for all financial variables
included in the first and second stage regression models. Table
7 shows the correlation matrix for the variables included in the
second stage regression. The Pearson correlation matrix shows
that the explanatory variables are not highly correlated with
each other. A general rule of thumb is that if the correlation
between two variables is between −0.70 and 0.70, there is
likelihood of no problem of multicollinearity (Lind, Marchal, &
Wathen, 2008).
Table 8 shows the regression estimation results for the deter-
minants of DLLPs. The models are significant at 1% level and
with an overall R2 21.6%. The dependent variable is DLLP,
which represents the discretionary component of loan/finance
Table 5
Test of difference.
Type of test Parametric tests Non-parametric tests
Panel A: Test of Difference between DLLPs Islamic and Conventional Banks
Individual tests Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) test
T-test Kilmogogrov–Smirnov (K–S) test Mann–Whitney (Wilcoxon Rank-Sum) test
Hypotheses Mean IBs–Mean
CBs F (Prob > F)
Mean IBs = Mean
CBs T (Prob > t)
Mean IBs = Mean
CBs K–S (Prob > K–S)
Median IBs = Median
CBs Median (Prob > t)
DLLPs 4.047 (0.03)* 2.102 (0.037)* 1.048 (0.222) −1.353 (0176)
Panel B: Test of Difference between DLLPs of Islamic and Local Private Conventional Banks
DLLPs 20.155 (0.000)* 4.489 (0.00)* 1.933 (0.001)* −4.594 (0.000)*
Panel C: Test of difference between DLLPs of Islamic and Local Conventional Banks
DLLPs 12.238 (0.001)* 3.305 (0.001)* 1.577 (0.014)* −3.688 (0.000)*
Panel D: Test of Difference between DLLPs of Islamic and Conventional Government Linked Banks
DLLPs 4.474 (0.037)* 2.115 (0.37)** 1.321 (0.06)*** −1.729 (0.08)***
Panel E: Test of Difference Comparison between DLLPs of Islamic and Foreign Banks
DLLPs 9.392 (0.003)* −3.06 (0.003)* 2.115 (0.00)* −2.589 (0.01)*
Notes: *indicates significant difference at 1%; ** indicates significant difference at 5%, *** indicates significant difference at 10%. The number in parentheses is
the p-values associated with relative test.
Table 6
Descriptive statistics for the financial variables.
Variables Mean STD Max Min
TE (EFF.) 0.68 0.25 1.00 0.10
LLPs %TA 0.013 0.021 0.135 0.000
NDLLPs%TA 0.002 0.003 0.018 −0.011
DLLPs%TA 0.012 0.021 0.132 −0.010
NPL%TL 0.231 0.247 0.954 0.000
CHLOAN 0.231 0.823 8.595 −0.998
CHNPL%TL 0.042 0.136 0.721 −0.276
EBTP%TA 0.038 0.046 0.303 −0.022
SIZE 56,390,514.14 65,420,960.37 379,844,496.00 3,011,117.00
LD 0.584 0.640 3.345 0.005
CAP 0.106 0.108 0.736 0.008
GDP 3163.48 1851.49 13475.38 859.10
Table 7
Pearson correlation matrix.
DLLPs TE CAP SIZE GDP LD
DLLPs 1
TE 0.089 1
CAP −0.028 0.057 1
SIZE −0.180 −0.093 −0.219 1
GDP −0.236 −0.017 0.209 0.53 1
LD 0.184 0.231 0.142 0.138 −0.02 1
Table 8
DLLPs determinants based on pooled OLS and random effects.
Variable Pooled OLS Random effects
Ln(TE) 0.004 (0.001)* 0.004 (0.001)*
Ln(CAP) 0.0012 (0.000)*** 0.001 (0.000)
Ln(SIZE) −0.002 (0.000)* −0.003 (0.001)*
Ln(LD/FD) 0.006 (0.000)* 0.006 (0.001)*
Ln(GDP) −0.005 (0.001)* −0.003 (0.001)*
Dummy Islamic −0.021 (0.003)* −0.019 (0.004)*
Dummy Auditor −0.003 (0.001)* −0.001 (0.001)
Overall R2 0.225 0.216
Within R2 0.158
Between R2 0.278
*Indicates significant level at 1%; ** indicates significant level at 5%; ***
indicates significant level at 10%. The number in parentheses is the standard
errors.
Note: TE Represents overall efficiency estimates based on DEWA; CAP is the
ratio of equity to total assets, LD is a measure of loans to deposit as a proxy for
external funds, Size is the total assets, GDP measures the economic soundness,
Dummy Islamic is to differentiate between conventional and Islamic banks,
dummy Auditor represents the type of auditor either big or non-big auditor.
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loss provisions and it is estimated as the residual of the first
stage regression. The results are presented in Table 8 based on
pooled OLS and random effects, although the explanation of
the results are based on random effects which is more robust
compared to pooled OLS, as shown by the outcomes of LM test,
which provides evidence on the superior power of the random
effects model. Overall, the efficiency (TE) is significant and
positively related to DLLPs at 1% level of significance. This
positive association suggests that the greater the efficiency, the
higher the DLLPs occurrence. This may indicate that efficiency
is reflected in good performance which would motivate the
managers of banks to reduce their overall earnings in order to
smoothen their income. Conversely, when the relative perfor-
mance is low, the bank managers would decrease their DLLPs.
The result is consistent with Kanagretnam et al. (2007) which
suggests that banks’ main objective in increasing their DLLPs
is to smoothen their income in order to reduce the variability of
income. By reducing the variability of income, the perceived
risk can be reduced.
Size may also be an indicator for the political sensitivity. The
estimation test shows that bank size is negatively related to the
DLLPs. In other words, DLLP is less pronounced at large
banks. The findings are consistent with Cornett et al. (2009)
in which they suggested that smaller banks engage more in
DLLPs. Cornett et al. (2009) argued that larger banks are
subject to intense monitoring and scrutiny. Although the regu-
lators have the responsibility to maintain the soundness of the
whole financial sector, they have greater tendency to scrutinize
the large banks due to the impact of those banks on the overall
economy should things go wrong. Due to that, larger banks
would be less likely to behave opportunistically by reducing
their discretion over LLPs.
LD/FD or loan/finance to deposits is related positively to
DLLPs at 1% level of significance. It is used as a measure of the
need for external finance as banks finance their loans/finance
portfolio using customer deposits. The findings of this study are
in line with the result of Kanagaretnam, Krishnan and Lobo,
(2009) and Kwak, Lee, and Eldridge (2009) where a greater
need for external finance would encourage bankers to smoothen
earnings. This is because the cost of financing is a function of
bank risks. The managers have more incentive to indulge in
discretionary LLPs in order to smoothen earnings and reduce
volatility so as to attract more funds. Additionally, in the spe-
cific case of Yemen, it is possible that Yemeni banks “manage”
their earnings in order to attract more deposits as Yemenis are
reluctant to deposit their money in banks. Therefore, one of the
ways to attract them is by managing the earnings in such a way
as to show good performance, signalling stable returns to the
customers.
GDP is an indicator of the soundness of the economic con-
ditions. In line with expectations, GDP is significantly and
negatively related to DLLP. This is consistent with the findings
reported by Bikker & Metzemakers (2005) and Fonseca &
González (2008) who found that during times of economic
boom, DLLP was lower compared to the period of economic
difficulties. In other words, provisions increase when the eco-
nomic growth is weak. The reason for is that the business cycle
affects the ability of the firms and other borrowers to service
their debt which subsequently influences the credit risk expo-
sure of banks. A decline in GDP growth would mean an
increase in actual as well as expected credit losses which
require an increase in provisioning. In such cases, managers
would reduce their DLLPs during good times and increase it
during difficult times.
The dummy variables “Islamic”, and “Auditor”, suggest a
negative relationship with DLLP. However, the dummy auditor
is not significant. Consistent with previous results reported in
Table 5, the Islamic banks experienced lower DLLP compared
to the conventional banks.
Although we expect that Islamic banks refrain from using
DLLP due to Shari’ah parameters, the results show both
Islamic and conventional banks follow same practice, though
the magnitude is different. As efficiency and performance are
used as yardsticks in evaluating managers, bank managers at
both Islamic and conventional banks would have motivation to
indulge in discretion over LLP in order to temper the low
performance of banks by decreasing LLP.
5.4. Further test: do the determinants of DLLPs differ across
banking models?
Further check is conducted to ascertain and understand
how DLLP may react to the determinants differently for each
banking model. As discussed previously, the LM test favours
random effects over pooled and the Hausman test asserts the
appropriateness of fixed effects over random effects. Thus, the
results in this section are reported using fixed effects.
The results of Table 9 show consistent results across
all models. The results further support the previous findings
reported in 8. Efficiency is positively related to DLLP, indicat-
ing that banks with higher level of efficiency tend to post higher
DLLP. Interestingly, the inclusion of the Islamic bank dummy
interacting with efficiency, shows that DLLP is negatively
related to efficiency in Islamic banks, although this is not sta-
tistically significant. It is also found that there is a significantly
negative relationship between bank size and their DLLPs. The
larger the size of the banks, the lower the DLLP activities.
Similar to the results reported in Table 8, it can be argued that
larger banks are more likely to be subjected to the scrutiny
which leads them to behave less opportunistically by reducing
their LLPs discretion. Conversely, the size of Islamic banks
seems to affect their DLLPs positively at 1% level of signifi-
cance. A plausible reason could be that the larger Islamic banks
are more profitable than the smaller ones, and therefore, there is
higher tendency or greater space to shift some profits from one
period to another.
Loans to deposits or Finance to deposits (LD/FD) is signifi-
cantly and positively related to DLLP at 5% significance level.
It could be argued that banks tend have higher non-performing
loans and, therefore, they may behave opportunistically to
reduce their LLP so as to reduce the perceived risks in order
to attract the depositors and external finance. This is evident
from the fact that most conventional banks have higher non-
performing loans that require higher LLP. Interestingly, Islamic
banks’ FD ratio is negatively related to DLLP at 10% level of
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significance. It could be argued that, when FD ratio is high, it
could be indicator of high quality of finance, and thus banks
tend to exercise DLLP with low magnitude.
Finally, the results of all models in Table 9 show that
capitalisation (CAP) has no impact on DLLP. However, after
controlling for Islamic banks, CAP seems to have a negative
relationship with the DLLP of Islamic banks. This could be
explained by the fact that, in the banking sector, equity capital
is heavily regulated. Therefore, when banks experience low
levels of capital, relative to the regulatory standards required to
be considered well-capitalised, managers have incentives to
avoid writing off bad loans and to realise more securities gains
in order to prop up capital levels (Cornett et al., 2009). In a sum,
the results of fixed effects reported in Table 9 are largely con-
sistent with the results of random effects reported in Table 8
with minimal variation.
Overall, Islamic banks utilize the DLLPs as a way of man-
aging their earnings in similar way with conventional banks.
Although the magnitude of accruals may differ between Islamic
and conventional banks, both models resort to earnings
manipulation for various incentives including the attractiveness
of deposits and reducing political sensitivity. More importantly,
the behaviour of incentives for both models are shaped differ-
ently which may reflect the different structure of both banking
models.
6. Conclusion
The study aims to investigate the DLLPs and its relationship
with efficiency, taking into consideration other micro and mac-
roeconomic determinants in a comparative manner between
Islamic and conventional banks in Yemen. Using two-stage
approach for a sample of 16 banks with unbalanced data over
the period of 1996–2011, the results indicate that both banking
models use the discretion over the LLP in order to manage
their earnings for various factors. In contrast to our expectation,
Islamic banks also resort to earnings management in a similar
vein with conventional banks, and ignoring their ethical identity
prescribed in Shari’ah law. However, the overall results show
that Islamic banks have lower DLLP compared conventional
banks with exception to foreign banks which report signifi-
cantly lower DLLP compared to Islamic banks.
With respect to the impact of efficiency of DLLPs, the
results show that overall efficiency results show positive impact
on DLLP, but the results are not consistent for Islamic and
conventional banks. Other control variables used in this study
also show different impact on DLLPs. Size and LD (FD) show
different behaviour for conventional and Islamic banks in its
relationship with DLLP. Similarly for capitalization, while its
negatively related to Islamic banks DLLPs, it has no impact on
DLLP of conventional banks.
Our results provide insightful benefits to regulators, auditors
and investors and the public at large. It shows for the public
that demand an ethical banking and hence this study helps the
public to make appropriate decision. For the regulators, it can
be a very useful to warn them to make effective policy con-
straining the intensive use the discretion over LLP to manage
their earnings and distort the information transparency of
banking sector. Furthermore, auditor can pay more attention
to the policy of LLP estimation utilized by banks when they
review, audit and express their opinion on the soundness of
financial statements.
Despite of it’s the considerable effort exerted in conducting
the study in order to ensure that the objectives of the study were
met and research questions were answered, one of the limitation
of the study is the small sample size, where it focuses on one
country with limited banks. Future research could further on
comparing the Islamic banks inYemen with other in Gulf Coop-
eration Countries (GCC) in term of their DLLP.
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